











































The attached material is posted on regulation2point0.org with permission.  
JOINT CENTER  
AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES 
 
 
The Value of Scarce Water: 
Measuring the Inefficiency of Municipal Regulations 
 
 
Erin T. Mansur and Sheila M. Olmstead
* 
 









                                                           
∗Erin Mansur is an Assistant Professor, School of Management and School of Forestry and Environmental 
Studies, Yale University. erin.mansur@yale.edu. Sheila Olmstead is an Assistant Professor, School of 
Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University. sheila.olmstead@yale.edu. For comments and 
guidance, we are grateful to Nathaniel Keohane, Sharon Oster, Robert Stavins, Christopher Timmins, and 
seminar participants at Yale, Camp Resources, and the California Occasional Workshop on 
Environmental Economics. The authors, alone, are responsible for any errors. 
  
 
J   O   I   N   T     C   E   N   T   E   R 
AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES 
 
 
In order to promote public understanding of the impact of regulations on 
consumers, business, and government, the American Enterprise Institute and the 
Brookings Institution established the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies.  The Joint Center’s primary purpose is to hold lawmakers and regulators 
more accountable by providing thoughtful, objective analysis of relevant laws and 
regulations. Over the past three decades, AEI and Brookings have generated an 
impressive body of research on regulation. The Joint Center builds on this solid 
foundation, evaluating the economic impact of laws and regulations and offering 
constructive suggestions for reforms to enhance productivity and welfare. The 
views expressed in Joint Center publications are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Joint Center. 
 
 
 ROBERT W. HAHN 
Executive Director 
  ROBERT E. LITAN 
Director 
 
COUNCIL OF ACADEMIC ADVISERS 
 
KENNETH J. ARROW 
Stanford University 
  MAUREEN L. CROPPER 
University of Maryland  
 PHILIP  K.  HOWARD 
Common Good 
 
        
PAUL L. JOSKOW 
Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology 
 DONALD  KENNEDY 
Stanford University 
 ROGER  G.  NOLL 
Stanford University 
        
GILBERT S. OMENN 
University of Michigan 
 PETER  PASSELL 
Milken Institute 
 RICHARD  SCHMALENSEE 
Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology 
        
ROBERT N. STAVINS 
Harvard University 
 CASS  R.  SUNSTEIN 
University of Chicago 
  W. KIP VISCUSI 
Harvard University 
 
All AEI-Brookings Joint Center publications can be found at www.aei-brookings.org 
 
© 2006 by the authors.  All rights reserved. Executive Summary 
 
Rather than allowing water prices to reflect scarcity rents during periods of drought-
induced excess demand, policy makers have mandated command-and-control approaches, like 
the curtailment of certain uses, primarily outdoor watering. Using unique panel data on 
residential end-uses of water, we examine the welfare implications of typical drought policies. 
Using price variation across and within markets, we identify end-use specific price elasticities. 
Our results suggest that current policies target water uses that households, themselves, are most 
willing to forgo. Nevertheless, we find that use restrictions have costly welfare implications, 
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Competitive markets are the most efficient avenues through which to allocate scarce 
resources to their highest-valued uses, under the standard assumptions. Yet, many important 
resources traditionally have not been managed through markets. Prominent examples include 
space on public roadways and airport runways, water supply, some telecommunications 
networks, electricity transmission and distribution, and, until recently, broadcast space on the 
electromagnetic spectrum and electricity generation. These goods and services have been heavily 
regulated, for a variety of reasons, with allocation and pricing (if any) controlled by public 
authorities. Where markets are not employed to allocate scarce resources, the potential welfare 
gains from a market-based approach can be estimated. 
We assess the potential welfare gains, and possible distributional outcomes, from 
switching from non-market to market-based regulation of municipal water supply during periods 
of drought. During droughts, municipal water restrictions focus almost exclusively on the 
residential sector, rather than on commercial and industrial water users.
1 Rather than allowing 
prices to reflect scarcity rents during periods of excess demand, policy makers have mandated 
the curtailment of certain uses, primarily outdoor watering, requiring the same limitations on 
consumption of all households. If indoor demand is not perfectly inelastic, or if households are 
heterogeneous in willingness-to-pay for water under conditions of scarcity, a price-based 
approach to drought policy has a theoretical welfare advantage over the current approach. The 
welfare gains of a price-based approach could come from both substitution across uses within a 
household, and substitution across households. 
Using unique panel data on residential end-uses of water for 1,082 households in 11 
urban areas in the United States and Canada, we examine the implications of the current 
approach to urban drought. Using price variation across and within markets, we identify price 
elasticities specific to indoor and outdoor water demand. Our econometric approach presents a 
substantial challenge, in that: (1) sixty percent of sample households face increasing-block 
                                                 
1 Of municipal water consumption, one-half to two-thirds is residential (Dixon et al. 1996, Gleick et al. 2003). 2 
   
 
 
prices, creating piecewise linear budget constraints under which demand and marginal price are 
systematically correlated; and (2) outdoor water use is censored at zero – households do not use 
water outdoors every day. 
We use these estimates to determine whether current policies target the water uses that 
households, themselves, would reduce in response to price increases. We find that outdoor 
watering restrictions do mimic household reactions to price increases, on average, as outdoor use 
is much more price elastic than indoor use. However, the real advantage of market-based 
approaches lies in their accommodation of heterogeneous marginal benefits. During periods of 
scarcity, in which regulators impose identical frequency of outdoor watering, shadow prices for 
the marginal unit of water may vary greatly among households. 
We divide households into four groups, based on income and lot size, and estimate 
separate end-use elasticities by group to assess the degree of household heterogeneity in these 
markets. We estimate shadow prices for water among all customers under four drought policy 
scenarios of increasing stringency. We then estimate utility-level market-clearing prices for these 
drought policy scenarios. Under a typical drought policy, one that limits outdoor watering to two 
days per week, estimated shadow prices are, on average, 178 percent higher than the current 
average marginal water price in these markets, while market-clearing prices are 118 percent 
higher than current prices. 
Note that the analysis does not consider whether water prices, in general, are set at 
efficient levels – only whether the particular policy instruments used to constrain use during a 
drought minimize the costs of achieving consumption reductions of a given magnitude. The 
market-based approach we simulate would re-allocate consumption during a drought so as to 
maximize the net benefits of the drought-constrained water supply. In this context, the questions 
we address are “second-order” questions, if current prices depart significantly from efficient 
levels. 
However, our results have important implications for municipal policies. The welfare 
gains from allowing substitution across uses within the average household during an average 
summer drought amount to about $27. Allowing substitution across households, as well as 
within, welfare gains from a price-based approach are approximately $81 per household, about 
25 percent of average annual household expenditures on water in our sample. 3 
   
 
 
Switching to a price-based policy also would have consequences for allocation. Drought 
prices would enable those customers who are the least price sensitive, the wealthy consumers 
with large lots, to reduce consumption much less than poor households with small lots, who may 
stop using outdoor water entirely, even under modest drought conditions. The distributional 
consequences of these changes depend on the assignment of water rights. If utilities retain these 
rights, their profits would rise by an estimated $158 per customer. Households would be worse 
off by $77, on average. Rebates to consumers could make everyone better off. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some simple theory and the 
related literature. Section 3 examines the econometric models, and Section 4 presents the data. In 
Section 5, we show our price elasticity estimates for various end uses and consumer groups. 
Section 6 discusses the economic consequences of current regulatory policies and distributional 
impacts of switching to a price-based allocation mechanism. In Section 7, we conclude. 
 
2. Theory and Related Literature 
 
Markets and social welfare in general 
The questions addressed in this paper arise from the general theoretical literature on the 
conditions under which gains in social welfare are possible through the introduction of markets 
for managing scarcity (Weitzman 1977, Suen 1990, Newell and Stavins 2003). Studies have 
produced theoretical and empirical estimates of the gains from increasing the influence of 
markets on: the distribution of space in the broadcast spectrum (Melody 1980, McMillan 1994); 
traffic congestion on roadways (Winston 1985, Kraus 1989, Small and Yan 2001, Parry and 
Bento 2002) and at airports (Daniel 2001, Pels and Verhof 2004); electricity generation (Gilbert 
et al. 1996, De Vany and Walls 1999, Kleit and Terrell 2001); and water supply across sectors 
(Howe et al. 1986, Hearne and Easter 1997). The gains from price-based approaches to resource 
allocation in these cases derive largely from heterogeneity in marginal benefits across potential 
consumers.
2 
                                                 
2 A related, prolific literature has focused on welfare comparisons of market-based and command-and-control 
approaches to environmental policy (Pigou 1920, Crocker 1966, Dales 1968, Montgomery 1972, Baumol and Oates 
1988, Tietenberg 1995). The gains from market-based approaches in the case of pollution control policies derive 
from cost heterogeneity among regulated firms. The advantage of market-based policies over prescriptive policies 
for pollution control has been demonstrated empirically for the regulation of lead in gasoline (Kerr and Maré 1997), 
sulfur dioxide in power plant emissions (Burtraw et al. 1998), and many other applications. 4 
   
 
 
In the literature on the economics of pollution control, analysts have focused on 
distributional outcomes where pollutants are non-uniformly mixed, creating variation in the 
marginal social benefits to different parties of market-based policies (i.e., some get more “clean 
air” than others). In the smaller, general resource allocation literature, distributional concerns 
arise from a related issue – the fact that high-value consumers of the good or service will 
purchase more, and low-value consumers less, if allocation occurs through prices. This is the 
advantage of a market; it is the source of welfare gains. But under certain conditions, like 
rationing during wartime, or in the aftermath of a natural disaster, willingness-to-pay, and its 
close associate, ability to pay, may seem to be unjust allocation criteria. 
Weitzman (1977) describes goods and services for which this is the case as a “class of 
commodities whose just distribution to those having the greatest need,” (emphasis added) as 
distinguished from want or preference, “is viewed by society as a desirable end in itself.” Within 
this formulation of the problem, the price system turns out to be the more effective way to 
allocate “needs” when preferences are heterogeneous or income distribution egalitarian; 
rationing is more effective under the opposite conditions. 
Water for residential consumption is an example of a good, some portion of which may 
fall within Weitzman’s need-based commodity regime (drinking, bathing, cooking), and some 
portion of which would not (swimming pools, lawns, hot tubs). The standard approach to 
allocating water under conditions of scarcity, wisely, restricts these less necessary uses, not basic 
needs. Yet, the standard approach does not recognize heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for 
these uses, and thus is likely to result in welfare losses, when compared with management 
through prices. 
 
Theoretical gains from drought pricing 
The current approach to drought management ensures that a citywide required demand 
reduction will be achieved by uniformly restricting outdoor uses. The theoretical welfare gains 
from price-based municipal water regulation come from possible substitution within and across 
households. First, prices allow households to choose end-use consumption as they see fit, given 
their own preferences and ability to pay (i.e., households could substitute some indoor for 
outdoor reductions). Thus, if indoor demand is anything but perfectly inelastic, the current 
approach creates a deadweight loss (DWL). 5 
   
 
 
We describe this DWL in Figure 1, which maps stylistic demand curves for indoor and 
outdoor water use against a required demand reduction (on the horizontal axis).
3 The outdoor 
reduction mandated under the current approach ( reg Q ∆ ) creates a shadow price for outdoor 
consumption (λ ) that is higher than the current marginal price (P ). Under a market-clearing 
price (
* P ), some of the citywide required reduction would take place indoors, and this wedge 
would disappear. All else equal, the less elastic indoor demand, the smaller the welfare losses 
will be from the current approach. 
Additional welfare losses from the current approach come from disallowing substitution 
across households. Household willingness to pay for marginal units of water may be 
heterogeneous, even within the same type of use. Mutually beneficial trades could be made 
between households with strong and weak preferences for outdoor consumption. Putting this all 
together, the DWL from non-market regulation has three components: some households consume 
too much outdoors, some consume too little outdoors, and everyone consumes too much indoors. 
Figure 2 describes households with the same indoor demand curve, but different 
preferences with respect to outdoor demand. Here we assume that indoor demand is the least 
elastic portion of demand (C), and that for outdoor demand, there is a group of relatively elastic 
households (A), and a group of somewhat less elastic households (B). If households are 
heterogeneous, outdoor regulations not only drive a wedge between outdoor shadow prices and 
current marginal prices, but, since they are the same for all households, they also create variation 
in outdoor shadow prices across households. A market-clearing price would realize all potential 
gains from trade, eliminating the shaded DWL triangles. 
 
Price and non-price water regulation 
To date, few studies have addressed municipal drought policies in this framework. 
Collinge (1994) proposes a theoretical water entitlement transfer system similar to the municipal-
level price-based approach we analyze empirically. One experimental economics study simulates 
water consumption from a common pool, and predicts that customer heterogeneity will generate 
welfare losses from command-and-control water conservation policies (Krause et al. 2003). 
Neither of these analyses estimates the magnitude of potential welfare gains, nor do they explore 
                                                 
3 We assume that supply, in the short-run situation of drought, is perfectly inelastic. 6 
   
 
 
distributional implications in any depth. Renwick and Archibald (1998) estimate water demand 
elasticities by income quartile in Santa Barbara, California, and use these estimates to compare 
the distributional implications of price and non-price water conservation policies, but do not 
consider welfare impacts. 
A few studies have empirically estimated the impacts of non-price conservation programs 
on aggregate residential water demand, sometimes jointly with price elasticities (Michelsen et al. 
1998, Corral 1997). Such studies analyze city-level demand across cities, constructing indices of 
the relative stringency of residential demand management programs. This approach impedes the 
direct comparison of the costs of specific non-price programs with hypothetical price increases to 
achieve the required level of reduction in aggregate water use.
4 We know of only one case in 
which such a comparison has been made. Timmins (2003) compares a mandatory low-flow 
appliance regulation with a modest water tax, using aggregate consumption data from 13 
groundwater-dependent California cities. Under all but the least realistic of assumptions, he finds 
the tax to be more cost-effective than the technology standard in reducing groundwater aquifer 
lift-height in the long run. 
  In part, the dearth of studies analyzing the welfare impacts of type-of-use restrictions in 
the residential sector is attributable to a variety of methodological challenges. Few data reliably 
disaggregate residential water consumption into its component uses. In addition, the presence of 
non-linear prices and the censoring of outdoor demand at zero complicate econometric analyses 
of this type. In our choice of econometric models, we draw on a well-developed literature on the 
price elasticity of residential water demand to meet these challenges. 
Of the hundreds of water price elasticity studies published since 1960, a few are related 
closely to our current work.
5 One end-use water demand study has been performed, including 
estimates of price elasticity for specific uses of water (Mayer et al. 1998). This study was the 
first to use data that reliably separate household water consumption into its component end uses. 
We use the same data, but ask different questions, and account for price endogeneity.
6 
                                                 
4 Not all studies of non-price demand management are able to detect an impact of such programs on residential 
demand. One study of draconian outdoor watering restrictions in Corpus Christi, Texas, during a drought of record 
in summer 1996 found no impact of the restrictions on residential consumption (Schultz et al. 1997). 
5 Meta-analyses suggest that the central tendency of short-run elasticity estimates over the past four decades is about 
-0.3, and of long-run estimates about -0.6 (Espey et al. 1997, Dalhuisen et al. 2004).  
6In estimating demand elasticities, Mayer et al. (1998) use average prices, not marginal prices. Ours is the first 
application of end-use demand estimation to treat non-linear prices in a simultaneous equations framework.  7 
   
 
 
Most U.S. water utilities charge non-linear tariffs to residential customers. These price 
schedules typically require a structural approach to obtain unbiased estimates of price elasticity 
and other model parameters. In the case of increasing-block prices, marginal price and the 
quantity consumed are positively correlated. Econometric techniques that treat piecewise-linear 
budget constraints in a manner consistent with utility theory derive from studies of the wage 
elasticity of labor supply under progressive income taxation (Burtless and Hausman 1978), and 
have benefited greatly from the generalizations of Hanemann (1984) and Moffitt (1986, 1990). 
Four structural models of water demand under non-linear prices have been estimated: Hewitt and 
Hanemann (1995), Rietveld et al. (1997), Pint (1999), and Olmstead et al. (2005). We use the 
parameter estimates from Olmstead et al. (2005) to construct our price instruments, building on 
their approach to ask and answer policy-relevant questions regarding droughts, non-price 
demand management, and hypothetical price-based approaches. 
 
3. Econometric Models 
 
For the estimation of end-use demand, in our case a pair of partial demand equations for 
indoor and outdoor consumption, the likelihood function in a structural approach would be 
complicated. The likelihood function for such models is constructed in part by using the block 
“cutoffs” (the quantities at which marginal price increases), based on total billing period water 
consumption, to determine the probabilities of consumption at all possible locations along the 
household’s budget constraint (linear segments and kink points). The likelihood function, in our 
case, would include a total demand equation, which would determine marginal price, and 
separate end-use demand equations for indoor and outdoor consumption. 
We develop an alternative approach here, due to the availability of water demand 
parameter estimates from an existing study using the same data (Olmstead et al. 2005). From the 
structural model, we derive the probability for each household of consuming at each possible 
marginal price on each day. Probabilities are calculated as functions of the structural parameter 
estimates, the data, and characteristics of each household’s water price structure (number and 
magnitude of marginal and infra-marginal prices, as well as block cutoffs). We use these 
probabilities to estimate an expected marginal price, the sum of the products of marginal prices, 8 
   
 
 
times the probabilities of facing those prices.
7 Price instruments are then calculated as the 
seasonal average, by household, of these daily probability-weighted prices. Appendix A 
describes the estimation of these price instruments in greater detail. 
We begin with a test of the validity of our identification strategy by examining a model of 
total daily water demand, using probability-weighted marginal prices as instruments. Using the 
same data as Olmstead et al. (2005), we replicate their results for total water demand, since we 
know those estimates to be unbiased.
8 
The equation for this total demand function is (1), in which  total w  is total daily water 
demand for household i on day t,  p  is the marginal water price for which we instrument, Ỹ is 
virtual income, Z  is a matrix of daily and seasonal weather variables, and  X  is a matrix of 
household characteristics.
9 The error structure comprises θ , a household heterogeneity 
parameter, and ν , the residual. 
    ln ln ln
it
i total it it i i it wp Y Z X α µδ β θ ν =++ + + + . (1) 
Having tested the usefulness of the price instruments, we proceed with the estimation of 
end-use models. We adopt different models for indoor and outdoor demand, due to the fact that 
about half of outdoor demand observations are equal to zero (and we observe no such censoring 
of indoor demand). The indoor demand equation, identical to (1), except for the different 
dependent variable, is represented in (2). 
    ln ln ln
it
i in it it i i it wp Y Z X α µδ β θ ν =+ + + + +  (2) 
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7 Kink point probabilities are, on average, 5 percent for two-block price structures, and they range from 1 to 3 
percent, on average, for four-block price structures. We divide the kink probabilities evenly (for each household 
day)  between the marginal prices on either side of the kink.  
8 Identification is possible because the estimated probabilities used to create the price instruments incorporate 
variation in price structures (number and magnitude of prices and block cutoffs), characteristics not incorporated in 
the second stage of our demand estimation. 
9 Virtual income is annual household income, plus the difference between total water expenditures if the household 
had purchased all units at the marginal price, and actual total expenditures. This standard technique treats the 
implicit “subsidy” of the infra-marginal prices as lump-sum income transfers, and is originally due to Hall (1973).  9 
   
 
 
Dealing with endogenous prices in the Tobit framework involves one extra step to obtain 
unbiased estimates (Newey 1987). In the first stage, we estimate fitted prices as functions of the 
price instruments and all of the exogenous covariates. In the second stage, we include both the 




Daily demand data are drawn from 1,082 households, randomly selected from billing 
databases in 11 urban areas across the United States and Canada, served by 16 water utilities. 
Observed households are detached, single-family homes, with no apartments or other multi-
family housing in the sample.
10 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. 
Households were observed for two periods of two weeks each, once in an arid season, 
and once in a wet season. Total demand was disaggregated into its indoor and outdoor 
components using magnetic sensors attached to water meters. These sensors recorded water 
pulses through the meter, converting flow data into a flow trace, which detects the “flow 
signatures” of individual residential appliances and fixtures (Mayer et al. 1998). We add together 
consumption from all indoor fixtures (primarily toilets, clothes washers, showers, and faucets) to 
obtain indoor demand, and consumption from all outdoor uses (irrigation and pools) to obtain 
outdoor demand.
11 Leaks and unknown uses are included in total demand, but are not modeled 
explicitly as either indoor or outdoor consumption.
12 
Water demand varies by season, but only for outdoor use. Outdoor water demand in an 
arid season is, on average, five times outdoor demand during a wet season. In addition, the 
fraction of observations using any water outdoors, at all, is 0.42 – the reason for choosing a 
censored regression model. 
In our tests of consumer heterogeneity, we divide the sample into four subgroups, based 
on income and lot size. Income is our best available proxy for ability to pay, and lot size is our 
                                                 
10 Households were randomly sampled from single-family homes within utility customer databases. Sampling 
procedures, response rates, and statistical tests for selection are described in Mayer et al. (1998), Appendix A. 
11 The listed indoor uses comprise 94 percent of indoor consumption, on average. Remaining indoor uses include 
evaporative cooling, dishwashers, bathtubs, water treatment, hot tubs, and humidifiers. 
12 Leaks comprise approximately 6 percent of total consumption, and unknown uses approximately 1 percent. In 
outdoor use, we can distinguish between water consumption for swimming pools from that for all other outdoor 
uses. We cannot distinguish among irrigation, car-washing, and washing of sidewalks and driveways, but these uses 
are all typically regulated or prohibited by drought policies. 10 
   
 
 
best available proxy for preferences for the services that households derive from outdoor water 
consumption (such as lawns, gardens, pools, and looking better than the neighbors). We expect 
that wealthier consumers and those with larger lots will be less price sensitive. Those with both 
incomes and lot sizes above the medians ($55,000 per year, and 9,000 ft
2, respectively) are 
categorized as “rich, big lot” households; those with both incomes and lot sizes below the 
medians are categorized as “poor, small lot” households; and so on for the two groups in 
between. In the absence of any drought policy these groups divide total sample water 
consumption as follows: rich, big lot (43 percent); rich, small lot (23 percent); poor, big lot (15 
percent); poor, small lot (19 percent). 
The households in the sample face either uniform marginal prices (39 percent); or two-
tier (44 percent) or four-tier (17 percent) increasing block prices.
13 Given cross-sectional 
variation and changes over time, the data contain 26 price structures and 47 different marginal 
prices, ranging from zero to just under $5 per thousand gallons. Average total expenditures on 
water in the sample, including fixed charges, are $326 per year, or about 0.47 percent of average 
annual household income. 
Price variation in the sample is primarily in the city cross-section. If we regress the 
natural log of observed marginal prices on our set of regional dummies, we obtain an R-squared 
of 0.34. Regressing prices on city fixed effects results in an R-squared of 0.75, on household 
fixed effects, 0.94, and on our price instruments, 0.88. Table 1 demonstrates that the mean of our 
price instrument,    p , is equal to the mean of observed marginal water prices, and the standard 
deviation is slightly smaller.
14 Data on household characteristics, including information on 
annual income, family size, square footage and age of homes, lot size, number of bathrooms, and 
the presence of evaporative cooling were gathered by survey.
15 We control for season (arid vs. 
                                                 
13 About one-third of households in the United States face increasing-block prices. Thus, these price structures are 
over-sampled in the data. This matters for elasticity estimates only if elasticity varies across price structures – an 
unresolved empirical question (Olmstead et al. 2005). 
14 For some sample utilities, marginal wastewater charges are assessed on current water consumption. In addition, 
some sample utilities benchmark water use during the wet season as a basis for volumetric wastewater charges 
assessed the following year. For households observed during these periods (and there are some in the data), effective 
marginal water prices should include some function of the present value of expected future wastewater charges 
associated with current use. We do not do this here; marginal wastewater charges are excluded from the present 
analysis.  
15 Evaporative cooling, common in arid climates, substitutes water for electricity in the provision of air conditioning. 
Less than 10 percent of sample households have evaporative coolers, but 43 percent of sample households in 
Phoenix have them, and about one-third of households in Tempe and Scottsdale. Households with evaporative 
cooling use, on average, 35 percent more water than households without. 11 
   
 
 
wet), as well as daily weather variables, including maximum daily temperature, and 
evapotranspiration less effective rainfall (0.6 times total rainfall). Finally, we construct regional 






End-use price elasticity  
We begin by estimating a total water demand model as in (1), using our 2SLS approach. 
Table 2 reports coefficient estimates and standard errors from two such models. The first column 
contains estimates from Olmstead et al. (2005), for the purpose of comparison. The second 
column reports estimates from a 2SLS random-effects model for panel data, in which the 
independent variables in the demand function are identical to those in Olmstead et al. (2005). 
This model generates parameter estimates that are similar to those from the structural model, 
with an important exception – the price elasticity estimate is not significantly different from zero. 
In the third column of Table 2, we group the city-level fixed effects from “test model 1” 
into regional fixed effects. This model captures exogenous sources of geographic and climatic 
variation, leaving enough price variation to identify a price elasticity. With regional fixed effects, 
we obtain estimates that are very close to those from the structural model with, unsurprisingly, 
somewhat less precision. The price elasticity estimate is -0.36, and strongly significant. We use 
test model 2, a 2SLS random-effects model with regional fixed effects, as our point of departure 
for the rest of the analysis. 
We then separate total demand into indoor and outdoor consumption and estimate the 
models given in (2) and (3). In Table 3, we report the full set of parameter estimates and standard 
errors (with the exception of regional fixed effects) for indoor and outdoor demand models, both 
annually and by season. 
Indoor use appears to be influenced by income and family size, and little else. Outdoor 
demand parameters are all significant, with the exception of home age. Many significant outdoor 
                                                 
16 Regions are as follows:  (1) Southern California (Las Virgenes Municipal Water District, City of San Diego, 
Walnut Valley Water District, and City of Lompoc); (2) Arizona and Colorado (Phoenix, Tempe, Scottsdale, and 
Denver); (3) Northern (City of Seattle Public Utilities, Highline Water District, City of Bellevue Utilities, 
Northshore Utility District, Eugene Water and Electric Board, Regional Municipality of Waterloo, Ontario); and (4) 
Florida (City of Tampa Utilities). 12 
   
 
 
demand parameters would seem to be drivers of indoor, rather than outdoor consumption (for 
example, the number of bathrooms). It may be that these variables are correlated with omitted 
variables that represent preferences for outdoor water consumption. 
Table 4 summarizes the results of these models with respect to price, the parameter of 
interest, and reports elasticities, rather than price coefficient estimates, for the outdoor models.
17 
The partial demand models reveal striking variation in elasticity across uses and, for outdoor use, 
across seasons. None of the indoor elasticity estimates are significantly different from zero (the 
estimates are very small in magnitude, as well). Outdoor demand in the wet season is the most 
price elastic (-1.18), and is still quite responsive to price in the arid season (-0.74). In fact, 
essentially all of the strong seasonal variation we observe in total water consumption is 
attributable to outdoor use.
18  
Results reported in Table 4 might suggest that regulators’ focus on outdoor consumption 
as a target of command-and-control water conservation policies provides a good first 
approximation to a price-based approach. Indeed, outdoor uses are the uses that households, 
themselves, would choose to cut back the most in response to a price increase. But an important 
cost of the prescriptive approach derives from the heterogeneity of regulated entities – in this 
case, households. If households are heterogeneous in their preferences for outdoor consumption, 
across-the-board outdoor water use restrictions will ignore that heterogeneity, generating welfare 
losses relative to a price-based approach. 
 
Consumer heterogeneity  
To test whether households are, in fact, heterogeneous in their preferences for water 
consumption, we divide the sample into four sub-groups, based on income and lot size.
19 We 
estimate separate elasticities for the four groups. Results, reported in Table 5, indicate a high 
degree of heterogeneity. For all customer groups, the price elasticity of indoor demand is 
insignificantly different from zero. Households presumed to have the strongest preferences for 
                                                 
17 The Tobit price coefficients are not elasticities – see the notes to Table 4 for the calculation of Tobit elasticities. 
For these estimates, we calculate the Tobit model allowing different coefficients on price for the arid and wet 
seasons. 
18 We have no information on available substitutes for municipal tap water in outdoor uses, which might include 
groundwater wells or public surface water sources. To the extent that these substitutes are available in the sample, 
our outdoor elasticity estimates are greater in magnitude than they would be in the absence of substitutes. 
19 We define these heterogeneous groups based on sample median income and lot size, and test an alternative 
definition of city-specific median lot size as a robustness check (see Appendix B). 13 
   
 
 
outdoor water consumption, the “rich, big lot” group, exhibit the least elastic outdoor demand (-
0.48). Those presumed to have the weakest preferences for outdoor consumption, the “poor, 
small lot” group, exhibit the most elastic outdoor demand (-0.87). The two middle groups appear 




We test the robustness of our elasticity estimates by exploring a number of other model 
specifications. These include demand functions with household fixed effects and functions with 
city fixed effects (rather than regional fixed effects). We also examine a model that collapses the 
daily variation in household demand, obtaining parameter estimates from regressions of 
aggregate seasonal household demand on the covariates of interest. We find our results to be 
qualitatively robust to these alternative models and others. See Appendix B for details. 
 
6. Simulations and Discussion 
 
In this section, we describe our drought policy simulations and estimate shadow and 
market-clearing prices. We then examine the potential welfare gains from and distributional 
implications of using prices to regulate municipal drought. 
 
Simulating drought policy 
Traditional regulations typically limit the number of days in a week that households may 
use water outdoors, whether for watering lawns, washing automobiles, or filling swimming 
pools. During the most recent multi-year, statewide drought in California, 1987-1992, between 
65 and 80 percent of urban water utilities implemented outdoor watering restrictions. Most of 
these were mandatory, but not well enforced (Dixon et al. 1996). The stringency of these type-
of-use restrictions (and their enforcement) varies greatly. A common policy is to limit outdoor 
watering to two days a week. We examine the implications of this policy, as well as limits of 
three, one, and zero days per week. 
                                                 
20 F-tests find “rich, big lot” to differ significantly from “rich small,” “poor big,” and “poor small” (P-values are 
0.01, 0.02, and 0.01, respectively). The other categories do not differ significantly from each other. 14 
   
 
 
Households’ willingness to pay for the marginal unit of water should increase with 
drought policy stringency. To calculate these shadow prices ( it λ ), we estimate the constrained 
level of expected consumption for each household under each policy, and then “back up” along 
that household’s demand curve – using equation (3) – to obtain their willingness-to-pay for the 
marginal unit of water.
21 Some households are unconstrained by the policies; their probability of 
watering on a given day is less than or equal to the probability imposed by the watering 
restrictions. For constrained households, we calculate the difference in their expected quantity 
demanded in the unrestricted and restricted scenarios. 
For example, for a twice-per-week watering policy, the restricted probability of watering 
is 2/7 (assuming full compliance). So a household with a probability of watering greater than 2/7 
is constrained, and will have a resulting decrease in expected quantity demanded,  ()
it out Ew ∆ , as 
in (4). 
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We estimate  ( )
it out Ew ∆  for the arid days only, and for the four drought policies described above. 
 
Caveats 
We face a choice of simulating utilities’ stated policies, or simulating the actual results of 
their stated policies, and we choose the former. This gives rise to two important issues. First, our 
analysis assumes that the necessary aggregate (utility-wide) demand reduction is that which 
would be achieved under full compliance with the various drought policies. We could easily add 
a probability of compliance that is less than one to the analysis, but doing so would be equivalent 
                                                 
21 We estimate shadow prices using the outdoor price coefficient underlying the elasticity in Table 5.  15 
   
 
 
to simulating different drought policies than those we select.
22 It is likely that compliance will be 
higher under a price-based policy than under the current prescriptive approach.
23 Nevertheless, 
were utilities to estimate market-clearing prices, they might want to charge slightly higher prices, 
anticipating less than full compliance, depending on the importance of meeting the demand 
reduction.
24 
Second, we assume conditional outdoor demand is unchanged under the simulated 
drought policies – households water less frequently, in compliance with the policy, but the same 
amount per watering as they did in the absence of regulation. Most municipal drought ordinances 
forbid allowing water to run off of residential properties onto sidewalks and streets, making it 
unlikely that households would over-water in response to reduced allowable watering frequency. 
Nonetheless, if conditional demand were to increase under the drought policies we simulate, it 
would decrease the aggregate demand reduction achieved. Thus, like full compliance, our 
assumption regarding conditional demand could be altered simply by simulating different 
drought policies than those we choose. Were we to deal with both of these issues by simulating a 
set of percentage aggregate demand reductions, rather than allowable frequency of watering, we 
would lose an important benefit of our current approach. The apportionment of aggregate 
reductions across households would be arbitrary, whereas now it is based upon a household’s 
probability of watering, calculated using the data and parameter estimates. 
Finally, note that we do not simulate the impact on demand and welfare of an actual 
drought – we make no changes to evapotranspiration, rainfall, or maximum daily temperature. 
Simulating an actual drought would increase the welfare impact of moving to a price-based 
approach, due to the reduced availability of a substitute (rain), but not by much. Even a 25 
percent increase in our weather variable that describes outdoor watering needs (weath) would 
increase consumption by less than one percent.
25 In addition, the characteristics of a drought vary 
                                                 
22 If non-compliance is punished with a fine, some of the benefits of drought pricing may be realized under the 
command-and-control policy, depending on the magnitude of the fine. 
23 “Cheating” in the market context would require that households figure out how to consume piped water outdoors 
off-meter, and in the current context can easily be accomplished by watering at night, or in some other way that 
avoids observation by utility staff or vengeful neighbors. 
24 This is always the case with a market approach based on prices, rather than quantities (Weitzman 1973). While a 
quantity instrument (like tradable permits) would be preferable in cases where utilities had very strict quantity 
constraints, such as the threat of violation of a treaty over shared water resources, the transactions costs involved in 
establishing a household-level trading regime would likely be prohibitive. 
25 Our calculation is based on the sample average and coefficient estimate for weath reported in Tables 1 and 2, 
respectively. Note the substantial variation in weath; a 25 percent increase is not out-of-sample. 16 
   
 
 
significantly across sample cities, depending not on weather variables, alone, but also reservoir 
capacity and other characteristics. Simulating drought, and not just drought policy, in this wide 
cross-section of North American cities would be somewhat arbitrary. 
 
Shadow prices  
The evidence of heterogeneity among households from Section 5.2 suggests that, when 
outdoor water consumption is restricted by drought policy, shadow prices for the marginal unit 
of water will vary significantly. Variation in shadow prices would indicate potential gains from 
trade. For example, a price-based approach would lead to smaller reductions in outdoor 
consumption by the least elastic groups, larger reductions by the most elastic groups, and, 
perhaps, small reductions in indoor use by all groups (Figure 2). Based on the separate elasticity 
estimates for our household sub-groups, we calculate shadow prices (by household-day) and 
market-clearing prices (by utility) under drought policies of varying stringency. 
Table 6 reports shadow prices for the arid season. In the most extreme policy, when no 
watering is allowed, our nonlinear functional form implies an infinite shadow price for all 
customers. We assume that the willingness-to-pay is at most $50 per thousand gallons. The most 
common policy (of allowing outdoor watering two days per week) has an average shadow price 
of $4.98 per thousand gallons. Note that this is almost three times the average price consumers 
actually pay ($1.79). 
As we would expect, shadow prices increase with the stringency of the drought policy. 
Furthermore, the standard deviation of shadow prices across all customers is increasing in 
drought policy stringency. These standard deviations reflect the potential benefits from 
establishing a price-based policy. For example, Figure 3 provides histograms of shadow prices in 
two cities given a policy limiting outdoor watering to two days a week.
26 Even in cities with 
relatively small standard deviations in shadow prices (like Eugene, Oregon), we see there is a lot 
of variation and that shadow prices tend to be right-skewed. There are some households with 
much higher shadow prices than the average. Under drought pricing, all households will 
consume such that shadow prices are equal; all gains from trade will be realized. 
                                                 
26 We chose two cities (Eugene, Oregon, and San Diego, California) that provide examples with low and average 
amounts of variation in shadow prices, respectively. 17 





We then construct market-clearing prices under drought policies of varying stringency. 
Here we assume that each utility’s goal is simply to save the aggregate quantity of water it would 
save by implementing each type of drought policy, no matter how that aggregate water 
consumption reduction is achieved. The aggregate water savings implied by each drought policy 
is the sum over the  ( )
it out Ew ∆  in (4), for all households within a utility. From the households’ 
perspective, these savings could be achieved indoors, outdoors, or by purchasing “credits” from 
another household.
27, 28 We then identify the market-clearing price for that aggregate reduction, 
constraining households to non-negative consumption.
29  
In Figure 3, the solid vertical lines denote the market-clearing prices for two cities. 
Differences in average shadow and market prices are created by the skewness of shadow prices 
and magnified by their variation. In Eugene, where there was relatively little shadow price 
variation, the market-clearing price is close to the average of the shadow prices. In San Diego, 
we see a larger difference between the shadow prices and the market price. 
The last column of Table 6 reports market-clearing prices across all cities. Like the 
shadow prices, market-clearing prices increase monotonically with the stringency of watering 
restrictions. Within a utility, there is a common price. While not as large as the variation within 
shadow prices, we still find that market-clearing prices vary substantially across utilities. For the 
most common drought policy, the average market-clearing price is $3.90 per thousand gallons, or 
slightly more than twice the current mean marginal price. 
                                                 
27 An actual tradable credit system would likely be infeasible due to large transactions costs. However, with no 
uncertainty, a regulator could equivalently set a higher price so as to clear the market. 
28 Price coefficients for indoor and outdoor demand underlying the indoor and outdoor elasticities reported in Table 
5 are used for estimation of shadow and market prices. While indoor elasticity estimates in our models are not 
significantly different from zero, not all indoor uses are perfectly inelastic. In separate demand equations for indoor 
uses, we find that showers and clothes-washing each have elasticities of about –0.22 (significant at .05), using Tobit 
models for both due to censoring. The other indoor uses have demand curves that are approximately vertical. Given 
evidence of some price-responsiveness indoors, and the small likelihood that utilities would or could regulate 
specific indoor uses, we use our overall indoor elasticity estimates in the welfare analysis. 
29 Market-clearing prices are estimated for the irrigation season, assuming that drought regulations are implemented 
primarily during arid months.  18 





The management of water scarcity through residential outdoor watering restrictions 
results in substantial welfare losses, given the observed heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay. 
Welfare losses calculated in this context (with a reduced-form model, and Marshallian demand 
curves) should be considered very rough estimates. Nonetheless, we do calculate them.
30 
For each utility, we simulate the welfare effects of a two-day per week watering policy 
over a 180-day drought-struck irrigation season. Deadweight losses (DWL) under the current 
regime represent the estimated benefit to the average household of introducing drought pricing.
31 
First, if we assume households are homogeneous and allow them to substitute some indoor for 
outdoor reductions, the average DWL is $26.90 per household.
32 Next, we allow substitution 
across households. Table 7 summarizes our findings on a per household basis. Estimated DWL 
ranges from $1.71 per household, in the service area of Seattle Public Utilities, to $437 per 
household, in the service area of Las Virgenes Municipal Water District. The variation in DWL 
from the current regulations is attributable, in part, to the standard deviation of shadow prices, a 
strong indicator of potential gains from trade. In our sample, society would be better off by about 
$81 per household through the introduction of drought pricing. 
The discussion of price-based approaches is largely hypothetical under the current 
regulatory structure. Estimated market-clearing prices are greater than current average marginal 
prices in all of these markets, in some cases by very large magnitudes. If they are also higher 
than average costs, prices this high would be impossible to implement without significant rebates 
of some form, as we discuss in Section 6.5. 
In addition, we face the standard worry about the welfare effects of a theoretical first-best 
policy in a second-best setting (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956, Harberger 1974). The fact that ours 
is a partial equilibrium analysis may be of less concern than in the well-known theoretical and 
empirical studies of environmental taxation in a second-best setting (Sandmo 1975, Goulder et 
al. 1999). The closest case to our own, analytically, is that of proposed congestion pricing 
regimes. In that case, introducing market-based approaches changes commuting costs, spilling 
                                                 
30 We estimate deadweight loss by integrating demand curves, as discussed in Table 7.  
31 Presumably, if we included multi-family homes in a market-based policy, gains from trade would be somewhat 
larger. Their inclusion would add their (currently unregulated) indoor use to the “common pool” which, if sensitive 
to price increases, would be an additional source of reductions to support increases in higher-valued uses. 
32 This average DWL is estimated using the coefficients reported in Table 3. 19 
   
 
 
over into labor markets, which are already distorted at the margin by income taxation (Parry and 
Bento 2002, Small and Yan 2001). No such spillover (no pun intended) is engendered by 
changes in water expenditures which, in any case, comprise less than one-half of one percent of 
household income in our sample. 
In our case, the distortions of greatest concern are within water markets, themselves. In 
most cases, marginal water prices are well below the marginal social cost of water supply 
(Hanemann 1997, Timmins 2003). Applying a price-based approach to drought policy will result 
in higher marginal prices for all households (even if total expenditures fall for some households 
through lump-sum transfers). To the extent that price-based drought management results in more 
households paying something closer to marginal social cost, the pre-existing distortion does not 
change the basic nature of our results.
33 However, if marginal prices in the sample are well below 
marginal social cost, the welfare impacts of moving to drought pricing may pale in comparison 
to the impacts of moving to marginal social cost pricing, period. This is an important area for 
further research, but it is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
 
Distributional implications 
While the shift from outdoor watering restrictions to a price-based municipal drought 
policy would be welfare-improving in all markets, the distributional implications of shifting 
regulatory approaches depend on the allocation of property rights. Prices would re-distribute 
scarce water such that those with high willingness-to-pay for water consumption outdoors would 
consume more than they do under outdoor use restrictions, and those with low willingness-to-pay 
would consume less. 
Figure 4 describes the movement of water consumption across income/lot size groups 
that would be brought about by the shift from prescriptive to price-based allocation of water 
during periods of scarcity. For the purpose of exposition, we choose a two-day per week 
watering policy, and the market-clearing price that would generate the equivalent level of 
aggregate demand reduction. The consumption share of rich, big lot households would grow 
substantially, primarily as a result of consumption reduction by poor, small lot households, and 
                                                 
33 An increase in the marginal price of municipal water supply will generate an increase in the consumption of 
substitutes. Where groundwater is a viable substitute for municipal tap water, spatial and intertemporal externalities 
may result (or increase, where they are already present).  20 
   
 
 
to a smaller extent by the other groups. Hence, drought pricing would result in a water allocation 
that would “soak the rich.” 
Under drought pricing, relative to the traditional approach, the consumption share of the 
least elastic group (at least for outdoor uses), the rich, big lot households, would rise from 35 to 
48 percent; the consumption share for the most elastic group, the poor, small lot households, 
would fall from 23 to 16 percent, with smaller reductions in consumption shares by the 
remaining two groups. Absolute consumption falls quite drastically among all groups under both 
types of drought policies. 
Given the changes in consumption shares induced by moving from the current approach 
to drought pricing, the largest DWL under the current approach is experienced by the rich, big lot 
households (Table 8). But a more meaningful number to households is the change in surplus. We 
calculate the average changes in producers’ surplus (PS) and consumers’ surplus (CS), as well as 
the average change in CS by group that would result from the adoption of a price-based 
approach. On average, consumers in each group are worse off under drought pricing, primarily 
because current average marginal prices do not reflect scarcity, and are thus below current 
shadow prices. Thus, consumers would not support this efficiency-improving change without a 
rebate. The average PS, $158 per household, would be used for this purpose, as utilities in the 
United States are usually restricted to zero (or very small) profits.
34 Households’ minimum 
willingness to accept payment to support the policy would equal their average change in CS. 
Within lot size, a price-based system without rebates would be regressive. 
A progressive price-based approach can always be designed through the use of transfers. 
In the present case, this could occur through the utility billing process. Should utilities seek to 
address distributional concerns through the water supply system, rebates could be delivered 
based on income. Low-income households could receive sums greater than their minimum 
willingness-to-accept, since the average PS exceeds the average CS by the size of the average re-




                                                 
34 Note that the sum of changes in average CS and PS equal the average DWL, by definition. 21 





Using unique panel data on residential end-uses of water, we examine the welfare 
implications of traditional municipal drought policies. Using price variation across and within 
markets, we identify price elasticities for indoor and outdoor consumption. Outdoor uses are 
more elastic than indoor uses, suggesting that current policies target those water uses households, 
themselves, are most willing to forgo. Nevertheless, we find that use restrictions have substantial 
welfare implications, primarily due to household heterogeneity in willingness-to-pay for water 
under conditions of scarcity. 
Heterogeneity is often ignored in economic analyses, which proceed from the viewpoint 
of the “representative consumer.” For heavily regulated goods, estimating the welfare gains from 
introducing markets requires the opposite starting point—it is precisely the variation in marginal 
benefits that opens up potential gains from trade within non-market allocations. While we find 
that there is some potential for substitution within households across end-uses, most of the 
welfare gains from a price-based approach result from the variation across households in values 
for scarce water. 
Of all the currently regulated markets in which alternative price-based policies have been 
proposed, municipal water markets may be the easiest in which to imagine actually introducing a 
price-based approach, even one that involves lump sum transfers to achieve equity goals. 
Household water use is metered, and monitored by utility staff for the purpose of billing and 
collection.
35 Were such a system to be implemented, a municipality would have the rare 
opportunity to affect an actual Pareto improvement, in which gains not only exceed losses, but 
no household is made worse off. 
If concern about “everyone doing their part” during a drought is the reason for the current 
predominance of command-and-control, rather than market-based approaches to the management 
of scarce water resources, economists’ discussion of potential lump sum transfers and actual 
Pareto improvements may fall on deaf ears. There is irony in this. In the long run, command-and-
control regulations provide no incentive for the invention, innovation, and diffusion of water 
conserving technologies (outdoors or indoors). Water priced below marginal social cost, drought 
                                                 
35 This is quite unlike the case of market-based pollution regulation, which requires the installation of continuous 
emissions monitoring infrastructure (for tradable permits), or the case of congestion pricing, which requires a new 
system with which regulators can track consumers’ use of priced roadways.  22 
   
 
 
or no drought, also results in inefficient land-use patterns, like the establishment of large, lawn-
covered lots and thirsty non-native plant species where water is scarce. Further investigation of 
the welfare gains from water marketing, both within and across sectors, is an important area for 
further research. 
 
Appendix A. Estimation of Price Instruments 
The water demand function (A.1) is in exponential form, where w is total daily water 
demand,  Z  is a matrix of seasonal and daily weather conditions,  X  is a matrix of household 
characteristics,  p is the marginal water price,    Y  is virtual income, η is a measure of household 
heterogeneity, ε  is optimization or perception error; and δ , β ,α , and µ are parameters.
36  
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36 The structural model includes two additional parameters,  η σ  and  ε σ . Our 2SLS approach does not allow 
separate identification of  the two error variances. We use the structural estimate of  η σ to calculate block and kink 
probabilities in (A.5). 23 
   
 
 
Consumption only occurs at the kink point if the consumer maximizes utility for choices that are 
unavailable at all (pk,Yk), so for kink observations, 
**
12 11 (.)  and  (.) wwww >< . 
From the conditional price equation, we derive a daily probability-weighted price (A.4). 
Our price instrument is the seasonal average, by household, of    p . Errors are assumed to be 
independent and normally distributed. Thus,  (,)
ee eL N ηη
η µ σ ∼ , and integrations in (A.5) are 
over the probability density function of this lognormal distribution. 
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Appendix B. Robustness of Estimation  
The ideal data for this analysis would include a longer time-series component. 
Essentially, we have two price observations per household. For this reason, we cannot estimate a 
model with household fixed effects (FEs), or even city FEs, without reducing price variation so 
substantially as to prevent reasonable interpretation of parameter estimates, provided we are able 
to estimate effects, at all, that are significantly different from zero (recall that about 94 percent of 
variation in sample prices can be explained by household FEs, alone). 
  The best way we can control for household heterogeneity in this context without losing 
too many degrees of freedom is to include a household random effect in the models, as we have 
done. Hausman tests in most cases reject the null hypothesis that the random effects model is 
consistent and efficient. However, where we reject random effects, we do so largely because the 
estimates are more precise than they are in the models in which the Hausman test does not reject 
the null. 24 
   
 
 
As tests of robustness, we estimate models with household and city FEs, as well as those 
using aggregate data. For the latter, we collapse daily observations to seasonal observations, 
creating two demand observations per household, and obtain estimates from regressions of 
aggregate seasonal household demand on the covariates. 
The household fixed effects (FE) model generates an upward-sloping indoor demand 
function, though the price coefficient is insignificant; this is likely an artifact of the small amount 
of price variation available to estimate the indoor elasticity. This is true both for the 
homogeneous demand functions, and for those allowing household heterogeneity. The incidental 
parameters problem prevents us from estimating maximum likelihood outdoor models with 
household FEs. 
Table B.1. reports results of the city FE and aggregate demand models for homogeneous 
households. With city FEs, indoor demand is upward-sloping (though the elasticity is also 
insignificant), and the magnitude of the outdoor elasticity is much smaller than the magnitude of 
the outdoor elasticity with regional FEs. For this sample, the inclusion of city FEs substantially 
reduces price variation and results in noisy estimates of price elasticities. Fixed effects of an even 
finer level, that of utilities, might control for residential water conservation programs—and other 
utility policies—unlike either the regional or city FEs. The inclusion of regional fixed effects 
does control for long-run climate variation but cannot capture utility-specific heterogeneity. 
The aggregate demand models of indoor and outdoor consumption provide estimates that 
are very similar to their daily counterparts. That our models are robust to this seasonal 
specification is encouraging. However, the daily water demand models are preferable in that they 
provide more detailed information regarding the impact of daily weather conditions on water 
consumption. 
We run this same set of robustness checks (household FEs, city FEs, and aggregate data) 
on our estimates of elasticity across heterogeneous consumer groups, reported in Table B.2. 
Surprisingly, the city FE models are able to identify outdoor demand elasticities for each 
consumer group – they are approximately equal, in statistical terms. Results by group using 
aggregate data differ slightly from our daily models. Using aggregate data, the difference 
between the “rich, big lot” households and the other groups is more pronounced. The estimates 
for the remaining three groups are not significantly different from each other. 25 
   
 
 
Finally, we also test an alternative definition of household heterogeneity. The logic of the 
sample-level definition of heterogeneity is that wealthy households in one city are more like 
households of similar income elsewhere than those of lower income within a city, and that lot 
size primarily reflects preferences for outdoor water-intensive activities and services. However, 
differences in land values across cities suggest that an alternative model would consider lot size 
heterogeneity relative to city medians, rather than the sample median. We estimate elasticities for 
household groups using city median lot size and sample median income, and report results in the 
last column of Table B.2. Elasticities are somewhat less different across groups under this 
specification. The average DWL in this case is about $34 per household. In general, we find the 
demand models, in aggregate and by group, to be robust to the alternative specifications tested. 26 
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Daily household water demand 
  in season 
  off season  
Daily water demand outdoors 
  in season 
  off season 
Daily water demand indoors 
  in season 
  off season 
Fraction obs. for which outdoor>0 
Fraction obs. for which indoor>0 
Observed marginal water price 
Marginal water price instrument 
Gross annual household income 
Irrigation season=1 / not=0 
Evapotransp. less effective rainfall 
Maximum daily temperature 
Number of residents in household 
Number of bathrooms in household 
Area of home 
Area of lot 
Age of home 














































































































































Notes: kgal is thousands of gallons. 31 











Test Model 1 
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Notes:  * significant at 5% (
# at 10%). Dependent variable is natural log of daily household water demand (kgal). Model in 
column 1 is discrete-continuous choice model from Olmstead et al. (2005). Test models 1 and 2 are 2SLS random effects model 
for panel data, in which we instrument for marginal water prices. Estimates for city-level and region-level fixed effects are not 
reported. In all cases, N=25,668, with 1,082 households. 
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Notes: * significant at 5% (# at 10%). For indoor models, dependent variable is natural log of daily household indoor demand and 
model is 2SLS random effects, with 25,136 observations. For outdoor models, dependent variable is daily household outdoor 
demand and model is 2SLS Tobit random effects, with 25,707 observations. About half of the observations fall in each season. 
Results for regional fixed effects not reported. The variable perr is the residual from the first stage (fitted price) equation. 33 




Summary of Elasticity Estimates 
 




    




    




    




    
 
Notes: * significant at 5% (# at 10%). Elasticities are calculated for models reported in Table 3. Indoor elasticities are constant-
elasticity demand model coefficients. Outdoor elasticities are estimated as follows, where  Tobit α is the Tobit price coefficient, 
and P and w are sample averages: 
 



























     Rich, big lot 
 
 
     Poor, big lot 
 
 
     Rich, small lot 
 
 



























Notes: * significant at 5% (
# at 10%). The number of observations is 7,188 for rich, big lot; 4,016 for poor, big lot; 7,386 for rich, 
small lot; and 7,117 for poor, small lot. 34 


























No outdoor watering 







Outdoor watering once/week 















Outdoor watering 3 times/week 






































Estimated Welfare Impacts by Utility 
 
  













































































































Notes:  Shadow prices and deadweight losses (DWL) are calculated for a two-day per week outdoor watering policy. Estimates 
and averages are for arid season only. DWL is estimated as the area under demand curves. For indoor demand, 
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Average Change in Surplus/Average 
Annual Income 
Rich, big lot  $223.9 -$73.2  -.0006 
Rich, small lot  24.2 -109.3  -.0014 
Poor, big lot  11.7 -75.6  -.0026 
Poor, small lot  30.6 -47.2  -.0015 
Average household  80.6 -77.1  -.0011 
Suppliers (per household)  - 157.7  
 
Notes:  DWL is welfare loss from the absence of a market. Average change in consumer and producer surplus results from 




   
 
 
Table B.1  
Robustness of Elasticity Estimates 
 








    




    
 





Robustness of Heterogeneity Estimates 
 
  
City FE  
 


















Rich, big lot 
 
 
Poor, big lot 
 
 
Rich, small lot 
 
 













































































Notes:  * significant at 5% (# at 10%). Results in Table B.2. should be considered relative to the estimates reported in Table 5. In 
the city FE model for outdoor demand (column 2), the “rich, big lot” elasticity is weakly different from the others (p=.10). 
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Required demand reduction from all uses38 




Welfare Losses from Outdoor Consumption Restrictions  
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Figure 3 
















0 2 4 6 8
Eugene Shadow Price San Diego Shadow Price
Eugene and San Diego
Histogram of Shadow Prices
 
 
Notes:  Distributions are of estimated shadow prices for Eugene, Oregon and San Diego, California, given a two days per week 
water policy. Numbers at the top of the figure identify average shadow prices for each city, and vertical lines represent the 
alternative policy of a market-clearing price, in dollars per thousand gallons. 
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Figure 4 

































2 days per week
Market-based policy
with aggregate reductions equivalent
to watering 2 days per week